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Abstract
Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-
Turk) have emerged as platforms that facilitate the alloca-
tion of productive effort across global economies. Many of
these markets compensate workers with monetary payments.
We study the effects of performance-contingent ﬁnancial re-
wards on work quality and worker effort in MTurk via t-
wo experiments. We ﬁnd that the magnitude of performance-
contingent ﬁnancial rewards alone affects neither quality nor
effort. However, when workers working on two tasks of the
same type in a sequence, the change in the magnitude of the
reward over the two tasks affects both. In particular, both
work quality and worker effort increase (alternatively de-
crease) as the reward increases (alternatively decreases) for
the second task. This suggests the existence of the anchoring
effect on workers’ perception of incentives in MTurk and that
this effect can be leveraged in workﬂow design to increase
the effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing has become a new form of production where
a global population of workers make short-term contribu-
tions to tasks of their choice in online workplaces. For exam-
ple, in Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor
marketformicro-tasks,everydaytherearemorethan50,000
– 240,000 new tasks arrived and similar number of existing
tasks completed according to MTurk Tracker1; citizen sci-
ence websites such as Zooniverse and eBird have attracted a
large number of non-expert volunteers making contributions
to scientiﬁc projects in a wide array of domains, including
space, climate, nature, and health.
Crowdsourcing brings great opportunities to AI research.
Afundamentalproblemofinterestishowtointegratehuman
and machine intelligence to improve productivity of crowd-
sourcing systems. AI techniques have been used in design-
ing complex workﬂows and integrating worker contribution-
s in online labor markets (Dai, Mausam, and Weld 2010;
2011; Lin, Mausam, and Weld 2012a; 2012b; Kamar, Hack-
er, and Horvitz 2012). Such work often assumes an inher-
ent error rate for each worker and uses learning or decision-
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theoretic methods to estimate the ability of individual work-
ers as well as the inherent difﬁculty of tasks to decide on
when to ask more workers to contribute on a task.
However, human workers are motivated by various extrin-
sic and intrinsic motives, such as monetary rewards and the
enjoyment of completing a task (Benkler 2002). They may
be incentivized to exert more or less effort and be inﬂuenced
by their psychological biases when the design of tasks or
workﬂows affects these motives. Thus, a thorough under-
standing of how incentives affect worker effort and produc-
tivity in crowdsourcing is important for developing methods
to improve the productivity of crowdsourcing systems.
In this paper, we experimentally study the effects of a par-
ticular type of incentives, performance-contingent ﬁnancial
rewards, in online labor markets where requesters post tasks
with speciﬁed monetary compensation and workers choose
which tasks to work on and receive payments for work com-
pleted. Unlike in traditional labor markets, the size of tasks
as well as the amount of payments are often much small-
er and workers have much higher mobility in online labor
markets. These differences make the classical, fundamen-
tal question of the relationship between ﬁnancial incentives
and productivity relevant again for online labor markets. By
“performance-contingent”, we mean that the amount of the
reward for a task depends on the quality of work produced,
where the quality is evaluated according to some metric of
interest to the task requester. Although not all crowdsourc-
ing tasks use performance-contingent rewards (e.g. the qual-
ity of work for some tasks is subjective, not veriﬁable, or is
too costly to be practical to verify), such rewards are com-
monplace across traditional labor markets, making them a
good candidate to study for online labor markets.
A few recent studies explored the effects of ﬁnancial in-
centives in MTurk from several perspectives. Mason and
Watts (2009) examined performance-independent ﬁnancial
rewards in two experiments, where workers were paid a
ﬁxed reward for each task completed and had the option of
continuing to work on more tasks. They found that work-
ers chose to complete more tasks when the magnitude of
the ﬁxed reward increased, but the work quality was not im-
proved. Rogstadius et al. (2011) made a similar observation
in their experiments. Arguably, it is not surprising that the
magnitude of ﬁxed rewards does not affect the work quality
— after all, a worker is better off completing a task withminimally acceptable quality and moving to work on the
next task than spending more time on the task to produce
higher-quality work. Harris (2011) studied performance-
contingent ﬁnancial incentives (both rewards and penalties)
and showed that the quality of work was higher when hav-
ing such incentives than when not having them. Amir, Rand,
andGal(2012)replicatedresultsofsomeclassicallabexper-
iments in MTurk, suggesting that workers in MTurk reacted
to performance-contingent ﬁnancial incentives in a similar
way as people in labs. However, neither Harris (2011) nor
Amir, Rand, and Gal (2012) cast insights on whether vary-
ing the magnitude of performance-contingent ﬁnancial in-
centives affects work quality in online labor markets.
Our ﬁrst goal is to answer the following question:
Does the magnitude of performance-contingent ﬁnan-
cial rewards alone affect work quality and/or worker
effort in online labor markets?
There are reasons to conjecture the answer either way. The
intuitive logic for a possibly positive answer is that high-
er effort, which is costly, will result in improved perfor-
mance; hence, a worker when offered a higher performance-
contingent ﬁnancial reward is willing to work harder to get
a higher reward. On the other hand, the fair wage-effort
hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen 1988) in labor economics,
which corresponds to the theory of equity (Adams 1963) in
social psychology, states that workers have a conception of
a fair wage and supply a fraction of their normal effort if the
actual wage is less than the fair wage. However, a worker
may not have a fair wage for a task a prior and her con-
ception of it may be inﬂuenced by a prominent psychologi-
cal bias, the anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1974;
Chapman and Johnson 1994; Ariely, Loewenstein, and Pr-
elec 2003), which refers to the common human tendency to
rely heavily on the ﬁrst piece of information, which may be
irrelevant, in making subsequent judgements. In fact, Mason
and Watts (2009) found that the perceived appropriate com-
pensation reported by workers in a post-task survey was sys-
tematically higher than the payment of the task and mono-
tonically increased with the latter, suggesting that workers
used the latter as an anchor. This stream of thinking would
suggest a negative answer to the above question. In addition,
if the existence of the anchoring effect would make the work
quality and worker effort less sensitive to the magnitude of
performance-contingentﬁnancial rewards, itis naturalto ask
whether we can improve the effectiveness of such rewards.
This leads to our second research question:
Can we leverage the anchoring effect in a workﬂow to
improve the effectiveness of performance-contingent ﬁ-
nancial rewards in online labor markets?
Our Approach and Results. We design and conduct t-
wo experiments in MTurk, one with a task that primarily
requires motor skills and the other with a task that demand-
s more cognitive skills. In each experiment, we place two
tasks of the same type in each HIT (Human Intelligence
Task in MTurk) and consider four levels of performance-
contingent ﬁnancial rewards. These allow us to create three
sets of treatments for each experiment: (1) HITs where two
tasks have the same reward, (2) HITs where the second task
has a higher reward than the ﬁrst task, and (3) HITs where
the second task has a lower reward than the ﬁrst task.
Our results in the ﬁrst set of treatments give a negative
answer to our ﬁrst research question: neither work quality
nor worker effort is affected by the magnitude of the reward.
When comparing the results of the second and third sets of
treatments with those of the ﬁrst set, we ﬁnd that increasing
therewardforthesecondtaskleadstohighereffortandqual-
ity while decreasing the reward for the second task results in
lower effort and quality, and the effect is more signiﬁcant
for the motor skill tasks. These results give a positive an-
swer to our second research question. They suggest that the
anchoring effect is likely to be an important factor inﬂuenc-
ing worker behavior in online labor markets and by creating
an anchor with an initial reward level, workers may become
moresensitivetothemagnitudeofperformance-basedﬁnan-
cial rewards in subsequent tasks.
Other Related Work. In the context of online labor mar-
kets, in addition to work mentioned above, Shaw, Horton,
and Chen (2011) compared 14 ﬁnancial, social, or hybrid in-
centive schemes, including performance-contingent reward
and penalty, in their MTurk experiments. They found that
two schemes where a worker’s payment depends on the re-
sponses of her peers produced higher-quality work. In this
paper, we only consider ﬁnancial rewards that depend on
some objective measure of worker performance.
There is a large literature in economics and social psy-
chology on the relationship between ﬁnancial compensa-
tion and productivity, prior to the emergence of online
labor markets. Experimental results seem to diverge on
this problem. While there is a lot of evidence supporting
that higher level of performance-contingent ﬁnancial in-
centives improves productivity (Pritchard and Curts 1973;
Lazear 2000), some experiments concluded that such incen-
tives had no effect on or even hurt productivity (Jenkins Jr
et al. 1998). A well-accepted explanation for ﬁnancial in-
centives to hurt productivity is that introducing small ﬁnan-
cial incentives can decrease intrinsic motivations of work-
ers (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999; Frey and Jege 2001; Bowles 2008) — an effect called
crowding out. Ariely et al. (2009) also found that overly
large performance-contigent rewards hurt performance in a
few experiments that required mostly intuitions and simple
skills, likely because they triggered overreaction of worker-
s. We refer interested readers to two comprehensive meta-
analyses by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) and Jenkins Jr et
al. (1998) for more information on this literature.
Many psychological biases have implications on the ef-
fectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives. For example, due to the
loss aversion effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1984), which
refers to people’s tendency to strongly prefer avoiding loss-
es to acquiring gains, workers were shown to be more sensi-
tive to wage decrease (Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder 2009). Our
workonlytouchesthewell-studiedanchoringeffect.Ourex-
perimental design (sequencing two tasks with different re-
ward levels) is inspired by the study of Ariely, Loewenstein,
and Prelec (2003), where they showed that in the presence
of multiple anchors, the ﬁrst anchor is most inﬂuential.2 Experimental Design
In our experiments, we place two tasks of the same type in
each HIT. A worker of a HIT is paid only when she com-
pletes both tasks in the HIT. Speciﬁcally, each task in the
HIT has a performance-independent base payment of 1 cen-
t (i.e. the base payment for the HIT is 2 cents). In addi-
tion, each task offers a performance-contingent bonus. This
gives us the ﬂexibility of varying the bonus level for tasks
in the same HIT. We consider four levels of performance-
contingent bonus for individual tasks: 4 cents, 8 cents, 16
cents and 32 cents.
Treatments. We consider the following 10 treatments de-
ﬁned by the bonus level for tasks in the same HIT:
 4 base treatments: 4 – 4, 8 – 8, 16 – 16, and 32 – 32;
 3 treatments with increasing bonus level: 4 – 8, 4 – 16,
and 4 – 32;
 3 treatments with decreasing bonus level: 8 – 4, 16 – 4,
and 32 – 4.
The 4 base treatments allow us to investigate the effect of the
magnitude of performance-contingent rewards on the per-
formance and efforts of workers. The treatments with vary-
ing bonuses allow us to create an initial anchor using the
bonus of the ﬁrst task and, when compared with the base
treatments, study how the anchoring effect may inﬂuence
the effect of performance-contingent rewards.
Tasks. To understand whether the effect of performance-
contingent rewards depends on the nature of the task, we
consider two types of tasks in our experiments.
 The button clicking (BC) task: A worker sees a screen
with two equal-sized buttons, one on the top and one at
the bottom. The “target” button is green, while the other
button is gray. The “target” button will alternate between
the top button and the bottom button, and the worker is
asked to click on the “target” button for as many times
as she can in a three-minute task session. The worker re-
ceives the pre-speciﬁed bonus if she correctly clicks the
“target” button for more than 400 times in the session.
 Thespottingdifferences(SD)task:Aworkerispresented
two pictures that are identical except at ﬁve non-obvious
places. The worker is told the number of differences the
two pictures have and is asked to ﬁnd where they differ.
Whenever a difference is spotted, the worker can mark
it with a red circle by clicking the place in either pic-
ture. The worker receives the pre-speciﬁed bonus if she
correctly spots all ﬁve differences. The two spotting dif-
ferences tasks in a HIT use two different sets of pictures.
The BC task primarily requires motor skills of a worker. A
similar task, with buttons placed left and right, was used by
Horton and Chilton (2010) in estimating workers’ reserva-
tion wage in MTurk. The SD task demands more cognitive
skills as comparing two pictures engages a worker’s short-
term memory. Interfaces of both tasks are shown in Figure 1.
Experimental Control. To avoid complications of culture
differences in perceiving ﬁnancial incentives, we restrict our
experiments to U.S. workers. For each type of tasks, each
worker is limited to participating in one treatment and work-
ing on one HIT so that she is not inﬂuenced by other bonus
(a) SD task (b) BC task
Figure 1: Interfaces of the Experiments
schemes. Upon arrival, a worker is randomly assigned to one
of the treatments. For the SD experiment, the two tasks in a
HIT are randomly sequenced. We require every worker pass
a qualiﬁcation test on the payment rules after reading the in-
struction and before proceeding to the actual tasks. More-
over, to ensure that workers pay attention to the possible
bonus change, the bonus rule for each task in a HIT is ex-
plained immediately before the task, not all together at the
beginning of the HIT. After the second task in every HIT,
there is a survey asking whether the second task has higher,
the same, or lower bonus compared with the ﬁrst task.
3 Data
The experiments were conducted over a period of three
months. Across all treatments, 1214 workers participated the
BC experiment and 1270 workers were recruited on MTurk
for the SD experiment. We eliminate all data of those work-
ers who incorrectly answered the bonus comparison ques-
tion in the survey. For each experiment, we are left with 100
data points for each of the 10 treatments, which we then use
in subsequent analyses.
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Figure 2: Work quality and worker effort in base treatments.     
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Figure 3: Changes in Work Quality and Work Effort for Treatments with Changing Bonus Level. Mean values and standard
errors of the changes are plotted.
For the BC experiment, we use the number of times a
worker clicked the “target” button in the three-minute task
session to represent the quality of work produced. For the
SD experiment, the number of differences that a worker cor-
rectly identiﬁed is used to measure the work quality.
While there is no straightforward way to differentiate be-
tween the quality of work produced by a worker and her
exerted effort in a BC task, we consider two natural metrics
for measuring a worker’s effort in the SD tasks. We record a
worker’s activities in a SD task as a sequence of timestamp-
s. For a worker who identiﬁed n  5 differences correctly in
a task, she had a record of (t0;t1;:::; tn;tn+1), with t0 being
the time at which she loaded the task page, ti being the time
at which the i-th difference was correctly identiﬁed for all
1  i  n, and tn+1 representing the time at which she sub-
mitted her answer. The ﬁrst metric for assessing the worker’s
effort is the total time she spent on the task, i.e. tn+1 t0. It
captures the duration of her effort. The second metric is the
longest elapsed time between two subsequent timestamps,
thatis,maxft1 t0;:::;tn+1 tng.Wecallthismetriclongest
interval. It captures how hard the worker tried.
4 Results
We ﬁrst analyze our base treatments to answer the ﬁrst re-
search question, and then compare work quality and worker
effort in treatments with changing bonus levels with those in
the base treatments to study our second research question.
Magnitude of Financial Rewards
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) present the mean values of work quali-
ty measures in our base treatments for the BC and SD exper-
iments respectively. For the SD experiment, two measures
of worker effort (total time and longest interval as deﬁned in
Section 3) are presented in Figures 2(c) and 2(d). For both
the ﬁrst and second tasks, both work quality and worker ef-
fort have similar mean values across different bonus levels.
The ﬁrst and second tasks exhibit different levels of work
quality and worker effort, indicating the possibility of work-
er learning (or getting bored).
We then test whether the empirical distributions of the
work quality and worker effort measures are statistically the
same across 4 bonus levels in our base treatments. For ex-
ample, for the ﬁrst task in the BC experiment, we have 4
samples of the number of clicks on the target button, one for
each of the base treatments and containing 100 data points;
we intend to test whether these 4 samples come from the
same distribution. The statistical test used is the Kruskal-
Wallis one-way analysis of variance (Kruskal-Wallis one-
way ANOVA), which is a non-parametric method for testing
whether multiple samples originate from the same distribu-
tion.Thep-valuesofthetestfortheﬁrstandsecondtasksare
reported in Table 1. The test results indicate that the magni-
tude of performance-based ﬁnancial rewards alone does not
affect work quality and worker effort.
Table 1: p-values of the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA
on base treatments.
Metrics Task 1 Task 2
BC: # of clicks on target 0.82 0.40
SD: # of differences spotted 0.33 0.15
SD: total time 0.37 0.29
SD: longest interval 0.41 0.24
Inﬂuencing the Effectiveness of Financial Rewards
Proceeding to examine treatments with changing bonus lev-
els, we focus on exploring whether the bonus for the ﬁrst
task in a HIT may serve as an initial anchor for workers and
make them sensitive to the bonus change in the second task.Table 2: Differences of the mean values for the change in worker quality and worker effort for pairs of treatments. For a pairwise
comparison, treatment A vs. treatment B, the reported value for a metric is the mean change of the metric in treatment B minus
the mean change in the metric in treatment A. X is ﬁxed to be 4. The statistical signiﬁcance of the two-sided t-test is marked as
a superscript, with y, *, **, and *** representing signiﬁcance levels of 0:1, 0:05, 0:01, and 0:001 respectively.
(a) Base treatments vs. treatments with increasing bonus
Metrics X – X vs. X – Y Y – Y vs. X – Y
Y = 8 Y = 16 Y = 32 Y = 8 Y = 16 Y = 32
BC: change in # of clicks on target 27.86* 46.50*** 49.30*** 2.54 32.48* 20.77y
SD: change in # of differences spotted 0.02 0.16 0.30* 0.01 0.10 0.16
SD: change in total time 87.09* 87.35** 94.52** 82.97* 49.38y 63.27y
SD: change in longest interval 64.58* 44.29* 55.76* 82.56* 24.75 34.39*
(b) Base treatments vs. treatments with decreasing bonus
Metrics Y – Y vs. Y – X X – X vs. Y – X
Y = 8 Y = 16 Y = 32 Y = 8 Y = 16 Y = 32
BC: change in # of clicks on target 3.06 -52.15** -64.46*** 28.38 -38.13* -35.93*
SD: change in # of differences spotted -0.11 -0.37** -0.76*** -0.10 -0.31* -0.62***
SD: change in total time 3.79 -68.66* -58.62* 7.91 -30.69 -27.37
SD: change in longest interval 21.15 -30.86 -42.87y 3.17 -11.31 -21.50
In this section, unless otherwise speciﬁed, our analysis is on
the change in work quality and worker effort from the ﬁrst
task to the second task in a HIT. That is, for a metric of work
quality or worker effort, the change in it for a HIT equal-
s the value of the metric for the second task minus that for
the ﬁrst task in the HIT. Visually, samples of these changes
do not deviate from normal distribution. We hence use one-
way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) and two-sided
t-tests, both assuming normal distribution of errors, in the
subsequent statistical analysis.
As a base line, we test whether the change in work qual-
ity and worker effort are statistically the same across our 4
base treatments. For each of the metrics (change in the num-
ber of clicks on target in the BC experiment, change in the
number of differences correctly spotted in the SD experi-
ment, change in the total time spent in the SD experiment,
and change in the longest interval in the SD experiment), we
test whether the samples for the 4 base treatments (4 – 4, 8
– 8, 16 – 16, and 32 – 32) originate from distributions with
the same mean. One-way ANOVA, with p-values 0.39, 0.69,
0.63, and 0.51 for the 4 metrics respectively, couldn’t reject
that they have the same mean, indicating that the change in
any of the metrics from the ﬁrst task to the second task in a
HIT is not affected by the magnitude of the rewards alone,
which is consistent with the results shown in the previous
subsection.
To see how changes in work quality and worker effort in
HITs with changing bonus levels compare with those in the
base treatments, we plot the changes across different treat-
ments in Figure 3. Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) present the
changes in work quality and worker effort for the 4 – 4, 4 –
8, 4 – 16, and 4 – 32 treatments, i.e. treatments with the same
4 cents bonus for the ﬁrst task but increasing bonus for the
second task. We see a clear upward trend for changes in both
work quality and worker effort as the bonus level of the sec-
ond task increases, except a slight dip for change in longest
interval in the 4 – 16 treatment of the SD experiment. Sim-
ilarly, Figures 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f) plot the changes in work
quality and worker effort for the 4 – 4, 8 – 4, 16 – 4, and 32 –
4 treatments, i.e. treatments with the same 4 cents bonus for
the second task but the bonus for the ﬁrst task ranging from
4 cents to 32 cents. The ﬁgures show a downward trend for
all metrics, except the change in the number of clicks on
target in the 8 – 4 treatment of the BC experiment. These
suggest that when workers are given the same bonus for the
ﬁrst task, the higher the magnitude of the bonus for the sec-
ond task, the higher the work quality and worker effort for
the second task are; on the contrary, if workers are offered
a lower bonus for the second task than for the ﬁrst task, the
larger the decrease in bonus, the lower the work quality and
worker effort for the second task are.
We then take a closer look and examine whether these
observed differences are statistically signiﬁcant. We con-
duct pair-wise comparisons of the treatments and use the
two-sided t-test to examine whether the observed changes in
work quality and worker effort for the two treatments in the
comparison originate from distributions of the same mean.
LetXandYbetwobonuslevels,X=4,andX<Y.Table2(a)
presents the pairwise comparisons of treatments X – X and
X–YandthoseoftreatmentsY–YandX–Y,withYvaries
from 8, to 16, to 32. The values reported in the table are the
differences of the mean values in the corresponding metric
for the two treatments in the pair. For example, for the X – X
and X – Y comparison for the change in number of clicks on
target in the BC experiment, the value reported is the mean
value of the change in number of clicks on target in treat-
ment X – Y minus the mean value of the change in number
of clicks on target in treatment X – X. The statistical signiﬁ-cance of a t-test is noted as a superscript. Table 2(b) presents
the same data, but for pairwise comparisons of treatments Y
– Y and Y – X and those of treatments X – X and Y – X,
with Y varies from 8, to 16, to 32.
Thus, each of the pairwise comparisons in Table 2(a)
compares a base treatment with a treatment with increas-
ing bonus. If increasing bonus for the second task improves
work quality and worker effort on the task, we expect to see
positive numbers in this table, which is indeed the case. For
the BC task, the improvement in work quality appears to be
statistically signiﬁcant. For the SD task, the improvemen-
t in work quality is not statistically signiﬁcant except when
the bonus increase is very large (from 4 to 32), but the in-
crease in worker effort is statistically signiﬁcant for most
treatmentswithincreasingbonus.Similarly,eachofthepair-
wise comparisons in Table 2(b) compares a base treatment
with a treatment with decreasing bonus. If decreasing bonus
for the second task is detrimental to work quality and work-
er effort on the task, we expect to see negative numbers in
this table, which is mostly true with some exceptions. None
of the positive differences are statistically signiﬁcant. The
decrease in work quality for both the BC and SD tasks are s-
tatistically signiﬁcant for larger bonus decreases. We see sta-
tisticalsigniﬁcanceonthedecreaseinworkereffortforsome
cases of the SD task, but not for the majority of cases. Over-
all, workers of the BC task response to bonus change in a
more sensitive manner than workers for the SD task. A pos-
sible reason is that the SD task is more interesting and hence
workers have a higher intrinsic motivation to contribute.
Finally, we ﬁt the data to a linear model to show that the
absolute magnitude of the reward for the second task does
not affect work quality and worker effort on the task, but the
change of the magnitude of the reward from the ﬁrst task to
the second task does. The model we use is:
Mi;2 =C+a Mi;1+b Bonusi;2+g DBonusi+ei; (1)
where M is one of the metrics of work quality or worker
effort (i.e. number of clicks on the target button for a BC
task, number of differences correctly spotted for a SD task,
total time for a SD task, or longest interval for a SD task),
Mi;1 and Mi;2 are worker i’s value of this metric on the ﬁrst
and second tasks respectively, Bonusi;2 is the bonus level of
the second task in this HIT, and DBonusi is the change of
the bonus level from the ﬁrst task to the second task, i.e.
DBonusi = Bonusi;2  Bonusi;1. Note that here we consider
the value of a metric, rather than the change in the value
of a metric. We include Mi;1 in the model to account for a
worker’s innate capability on the task. The regression results
for all four metrics are shown in Table 3. It is clear that the
bonus level of the second task does not affect either work
quality or worker effort, but the change of the bonus level
affects both.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the effects of performance-contingent ﬁnan-
cial rewards in online labor markets and attempt to provide
answerstotworesearchquestions:(1)doesthemagnitudeof
performance-contingent ﬁnancial rewards alone affect work
quality and/or worker effort in online labor markets? (2)
Table 3: Regression results for linear model (1). Estimated
coefﬁcients and standard errors are reported. The statistical
signiﬁcance is marked as a superscript, with *, **, and ***
representing signiﬁcance levels of 0:05, 0:01, and 0:001 re-
spectively.
Metric M C Mi;1 Bonusi;2 DBonusi
# of clicks
on target in BC
48.2**
(14.8)
0.81***
(0.04)
0.23
(0.48)
1.66***
(0.36)
# of differences
spotted in SD
1.79***
(0.14)
0.55***
(0.03)
0.004
(0.004)
0.01***
(0.003)
Total time
in SD
168.0***
(14.8)
0.18***
(0.03)
0.48
(0.82)
1.87**
(0.63)
Longest interval
in SD
110.3***
(11.1)
0.11**
(0.03)
0.16
(0.66)
1.15*
(0.50)
can we leverage the anchoring effect in a workﬂow to im-
prove the effectiveness of performance-contingent ﬁnancial
rewards in online labor markets? We give a negative answer
to the ﬁrst question and a positive answer to the second ques-
tion by conducting two experiments in MTurk, one with a
task that primarily requires workers to use their motor skills
and the other with a task that demands more cognitive skills.
It is shown that the magnitude of performance-contingent
ﬁnancial rewards alone does not affect work quality and
worker effort. However, the change of the bonus level from
the ﬁrst task to the second task in a HIT signiﬁcantly affect-
s both of them on the second task — increasing the bonus
improves them while decreasing the bonus hurts them. Our
results support that, given a type of tasks, workers in MTurk
may use the payment of the ﬁrst task of the type that they
encounter as an anchor to form their conception of a fair
payment for this type of tasks and their behavior is consis-
tent with the conjecture of the fair wage-effort hypothesis.
The practical implication of our results is that the design
of crowdsourcing workﬂows can possibly affect the effec-
tivenessofincentivesandhencetheperformanceofworkers.
Such impacts should be taken into consideration in design-
ing workﬂows.
The results of our experiments support the observation of
Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) on the importance
of the initial anchor. As a future direction, we would like to
explore the impact of subsequent anchors on the effective-
ness of ﬁnancial rewards. For example, when we have HITs
with more than two tasks and varying bonus levels (not nec-
essarily monotonic), do bonus levels for all previous tasks
affect work quality and worker effort for the current task?
Another direction we would like to pursue is to study the
effects of various peer prediction methods (Miller, Resnick,
and Zeckhauser 2005; Prelec 2004), when combined with ﬁ-
nancial incentives, on work quality and worker effort. These
methods reward a worker based on not only her answer but
also the answers of her peers, and hence are especially suit-
able for crowdsourcing tasks where the work quality is not
veriﬁable or too costly to be practical to verify.References
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